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“George Lamming the Existentialist” 
 
This essay argues that George Lamming’s In the Castle of My Skin offers important tropes  
in black existential thought that are synchronous with Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White 
Masks, but with a more detailed exploration of the concept of political complicity through  
his portrait of the phenomenon of slime and its correlate, the slimy individual.  The author  
also discusses Lamming’s treatment of the Fanonian motif of colonizing notions of  
normative development. 
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   I’m also aware, in a certain way, that for us 
our politics is central to our aesthetics. 
 
       —— George Lamming1 
 
There are many ways to do justice to a great writer.  One way is flattery through the 
art of imitation.  But such a path would only insult that writer since, in the end, it is to 
suffer the fate of all imitation, the fate of always falling short because of being measured by 
a standard that could never be one’s own.  It is a fate wrought with the gnawing 
consciousness of the unreal.  For in the world of the prototype, there is no worse fate, at 
least when it comes to works of art, than to be typical. Yet justice must be given its due.  
Much depends on this.  The deed that constitutes such achievement must be accorded by 
the only world that can do so, the world that constantly unfolds as “ours.”  Many options 
await, but I offer two.  First, make it appear.  And second, ritualize it by building upon it 
with the creative force that constitutes its breath.   
 
Existential dimensions 
That George Lamming is a great Caribbean writer is without dispute.  In the world 
of analysis, this observation calls for the task of determining what type of writer he is.  As 
many before him who made words meet in paper and ink, he exemplifies the complexity of 
the Caribbean spirit that defies a singular conclusion.  In many ways, this means that he is, 
essentially, always a little beyond himself, and in that way, he beckons to us that 
fundamental incompleteness that we all share.  True, we could take the age-old route of 
“guilt by association.”  Lamming, after all, took up company with such ravel-rousers as 
Richard Wright and Frantz Fanon.  The evidence is manifold—Wright’s introduction to 
Lamming’s classic novel In the Castle of My Skin; Lamming’s conversations with Fanon on 
the Algerian struggle at the 1956 Black Writer’s Congress in Paris.  But in the end, these 
are associations.   Friendship and tea—or better yet, coffee with Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Simone De Beauvoir offered lively conversations for Paul Nizan during their university 





the existential here faces a moment of its own suspension of its virulent critique of 
preceding essences for the sake of some ground rules for its own, paradoxical appearance.   
We must let some of Lamming’s self appear in his own words so that we may consider the 
man constituted by those words in the hope, ironically, of going beyond the man himself for 
the precious gifts he offered by his thought.  So I begin with a quotation from his first major 
work, from his beginning, which, ironically he chose to begin with a reflection on the 
completion or beginning of his ninth year: 
“RAIN, RAIN, RAIN . . .  my mother put her head through the window to 
let the neighbour know that I was nine, and they flattered me with the 
consolation that my birthday had brought showers of blessing.  The morning 
laden with cloud soon passed into noon, and the noon neutral and silent into 
the sodden grimness of an evening that waded through water. . . .  Nothing 
mattered but the showers of blessing and the eternal will of the water’s 
source.  And I might have accepted the consolation if it weren’t that the 
floods had chosen to follow me in the celebration of all my years, evoking 
the image of those legendary waters which had once arisen to set a curse on 
the course of man.”2 
 
Rain, rain, rain; water, water, water.  The fluid so free that it is the metaphor of 
freedom, and as such, it brings forth other metaphors in its constant flow that ushers in its 
paradoxical roles of life and spirit.   As life, it flows through us and is most of us; as spirit, 
it overcomes us in its propensity, as many Romantics saw at many seas’ edge, to become 
sublime.  Yet, even water suffers disruptions. 
 “Slime,” wrote Jean-Paul Sartre, “is the agony of water.”3 
 Sartre has written of the bourgeois consciousness, a consciousness so caught in its 
own desire to be unbound that it lives itself, literally, as if it has no flesh.  Such a 
consciousness convinces itself of radical freedom, where it becomes “complete” 
transcendence.   Yet, such a notion is a delusional existence, and like all delusions, it 
requires much to maintain itself.  It suffers and shifts, eventually, from the agonal to the 
agonizing.  It creates that which clings, leech-like, to each of its moments.  Sartre 
continues: “[Slime] presents itself as a phenomenon in process of becoming; it does not 
have the permanence within change that water has but on the contrary represents an 





possession. . . .  The slimy flees with a heavy flight which has the same relation to water as 
the unwieldy earthbound flight of the chicken as to that of the hawk.  Even this flight can 
not be possessed because it denies itself as flight.  It is already almost a solid permanence.  
Nothing testifies more clearly to its ambiguous character as a ‘substance in between two 
states’ than the slowness with which the slimy melts into itself” (ibid). 
 When I first read that passage from Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, I wondered 
about the historical significance of his reflection.  If slime is the agony of water, and if 
history moves like an unyielding river or, as it is often characterized, tide, then what might 
be the agony wrought by its recent, epochal flow?  What, in other words, is the agony of 
modernity? 
 The little boy suffers in Lamming’s novel.  He and many from the community of his 
childhood suffer the agony of modernity.  It is agonizing because it promises that which it 
is not prepared to give without a costly price.  The water first rained down as an omen, and 
then it was poured on him—witness the washing in the pail in the succeeding chapter 
(perhaps the dirt from his body symbolizing what is to be washed away while he is 
expected to remain?)—while the man whose tragedy, as Frantz Fanon kept reminding us 
through Friedrich Nietzsche albeit ultimately via Jean-Jacques Rousseau, is carried through 
this child looks ahead, hopes, and dreams.  He faces this world promised to him by empire, 
and he walks through it with faith in humanity that stimulates any one who still believes in 
promises.  But that world, he discovers, is a slimy one.  Richard Wright reflected on that 
world as one that constantly generates illicit humanity.  For him, Bigger Thomas was its 
agony, and even though such structural imposition never meant an absence of 
responsibility, there was always the sense that such responsibility was elusive at every 
moment the inner-man confronted a world in which he appeared locked in perpetual 
childhood.4  Wright subsequently raised the question of the modern alienation that militated 
against responsibility through the constant force of innocence.   Perpetual guilt takes away 
agency, which militates against guilt.  It collapses upon itself and renders such guilt 
“innocence.”5   “But Jesus called them unto him, and said, ‘Suffer [allow] little children to 





(18:16), but this makes the black condition one of double jeopardy—the salvation of 
becoming a man or a woman promises damnation here, but remaining locked as the 
innocent child for the sake of biblical salvation is a paradoxical form of condemnation. 
 Lamming’s child, who is the young Lamming, faces the governing, dual roles of 
water.  Its duality is marked, literally, in the shores of Barbados, which border a sea and an 
ocean.  It is there in the many canals and gutters of that island, whose collective 
description, one of imitation, cast a shadow over its inhabitants’ identity: “Barbados or 
Little England was the oldest and purest of England’s children.”6   An entire island that is a 
child.  Such is the way of colonial identities.  They are always new, which reconfigures the 
old.  In times past, there were inhabitants whose fate were already washed away by what 
the tides brought in from Europe.  In that death was born, allegorically, the new.  It 
occasioned labor to maintain commerce.  It occasioned the economy, the identities, the 
people, the New World.  And in spite of its age, it seemed never to grow up.  A world of 
children of all ages.  And as children, always innocent because always guilty.  As children, 
none of them are fathers, which means, in effect, that there are no fathers among them.  
There are mothers by virtue of having been born to them, but no fathers.  Fathers, as 
Lamming recounts, follow the tide of employment to distant shores.  Fathers, if they stay, 
bring forth allegories of death through the silence their presence occasions in a world of 
children.  No Oedipus complex here, Fanon, Lamming’s Francophone neighbor, recounted.  
How could an Oedipus complex emerge in a world antipathetic to the emergence of genuine 
adults? 
 To become an adult, one must let some things go.  The allegory of Mr. Foster 
echoes this insight under the torrents: 
 “And Mr. Foster?” my mother inquired. 
“I was coming to that,” answered the neighbor.  “Foster swear he won’t 
leave the old house, and went sailing down the river on the roof” (p. 6). 
 
Foster forgot that so long as he stood on weak foundations, he will be washed away.  Many 
themes of black existentialism permeate this remarkable text.  Black existentialism, as the 
name states, is existence understood through the human condition in black. Insight into this 





sistere, which means, literally, to stand apart or to stand out.  This makes existence more 
than being.  Something could be anywhere, but for it to exist, it has to be “here” or “there.”  
It has to emerge.  Even if from nowhere, it appears somewhere.  Black existentialism is 
about the emergence of black folk from the abyss of nothingness or, worse, irrelevance.  
But more, since black people did not exist as black people until the interplay of special 
historic forces, black existentialism is marked by the situated struggle with those forces.  
They are paradoxical forces, for black people would not have existed without them, and yet, 
they are the very conditions the overcoming of which would constitute black liberation.  
There is, in other words, an imperative from within black realities that call for the 
seemingly contradictory aims of their overcoming and maintenance.   The water needs wash 
away much, save the blackness without which is left nothing. 
 Black existentialism exemplifies the reflections on the humanity of black people, 
and with such reflections have emerged a unique grammar and tone.  Together, they 
constitute the blues that are the leitmotif of the modern condition.  Black existentialism has 
occasioned them through a variety of autobiographical texts.  In Frederick Douglass’s 
narratives, for instance, there is the boyhood relationship with a mother suffering the 
contingencies of a history that treats her and her children as irrelevant yet managing to 
create situations marked by the intimacies of the human face; there is an effort to reach out 
through the powerful force of words and reason only to be met by the dialectical limits of 
an external world that attempts to beat down the spirit of this growing upsurge of freedom; 
the intimacies of love that promises redemption but not escape; and the search for a 
talisman for freedom—the sign, the magical transformation of symbols, the semiosis of 
imagination and conjuring—only to be met by tearful transformation of the self in the face 
of reality.   In these movements, the black subject faces anguish, freedom over the 
constitution of the self, under the bitter irony of bondage.  What, black existentialists ask, in 
the resounding cry of W.E.B. Du Bois, is the meaning of such suffering?   
 Du Bois felt that such suffering brought, like the proverbial poet, the spiritual 
leitmotif necessary for an age heavily in danger of losing its soul.  The two souls of which 





situation of struggling to liberate even the pre-reflective understanding of itself that poses 
the problem of the self as a problem self.   Du Bois realized that this meant to be a problem, 
and Lamming, through the subtle reflection on a saturated childhood, experienced the same: 
“The image of the enemy, and the enemy was My People.  My people are low-down nigger 
people. . . .  The language of the overseer.  The language of the civil servant.  The myth had 
eaten through their consciousness like moths through the pages of ageing documents.  Not 
taking chances with you people, my people.  They always let you down.  Make others say 
we’re not responsible, we’ve no sense of duty That’s what the low-down nigger people do 
to us, their people.  Then the others say we’ve no sense of duty.  Like children under the 
threat of hell-fire they accepted instinctively that the others, meaning the white, were 
superior, yet there was always the fear of realizing that it might be true.  This world of the 
others’ imagined perfection hung like a dead weight over their energy” (In the Castle of My 
Skin, pp. 20–21). 
 The invisibility spoken of here is a function of a profound familiarity.  It is the 
paradox of invisibility by virtue of being looked at but not seen.  It is a theme throughout 
black existential literature; witness Ralph Ellison’s bringing it to the fore in his classic 
novel’s title, Invisible Man, which, too, charts the epic of a single black life as a life of the 
black.  Ellison’s protagonist, also a function of the New World, went black and blue 
through the interstices of modern rural and urban life.  Realizing that his humanity wasn’t a 
given, he searched for it and thereby exemplified the form of an existent seeking its 
essence.   While these existential tropes from realization of one’s responsibility for one’s 
way of being in the world and the ensuing struggle of a black subject with language; love; 
the body; double consciousness of a white world and a black one; recognition; a skewed 
social world against which to fight tend to be portrayed through an individual being—a 
single protagonist—in the North American writers, they take on the form of an almost 
transcendental subjectivity made flesh in Caribbean writers such as Frantz Fanon and 
Lamming toward an aim of collective and existential revolt.  Witness Black Skin, White 
Masks, where Fanon’s le Noir and le Nègre (“the Black” and “the Nigger”), where the 





which is learned the pitfalls of narcissistic self-deception and the over-determining 
dynamics of language; the impact of the social world on the psychodynamics of love; the 
ideological deception of constitutional inferiority; the cat-and-mouse game of historicism, 
Reason, and aesthetic-semiological resistance; the problem of psychopathology where 
white normativity militates against a coherent notion of black normality; the errors in a 
dialectics of recognition with a black subject; and the encomium for the body to transcend 
the “epidermal schema.”   One could easily be led to reflecting on what was going on in the 
Caribbean Zeitgeist to stimulate such poetic reflections on skin.  It is there in the title of 
Lamming’s first novel.  We should reflect on the problem of skin, for it is not as though the 
remedy for the social misrepresentation of skin is to be “skinless.”  Skin holds us together, 
it protects us, as Lamming’s use suggests when he recounts, “The likenesses will meet and 
make merry, but they won’t know you, the you that’s hidden somewhere in the castle of 
your skin” (p. 292).  Yes our skin is supposed to protect us, so when it becomes our enemy, 
the effect could be as with blood; we struggle against that which we cannot do without.  To 
be imprisoned by our skin requires, as Fanon later reflected at the end of Les damnés de la 
terre, the emergence of a new man—“Let’s start anew [literally, get a new skin (peau 
neuve)], Comrades, and set afoot a new man”—which brings to mind the constant 
awareness in all expressivist and dialectical theories of the human, that the human being 
needs a human world, but such a world stands, as Fanon observed, as promissory “yes” in 
the midst of a contemporary realization of  “no.”7  The circumstance of a social world that 
militates against its sociality, against its intersubjective reaching out that constitutes a 
human world, is claustrophobic.  Black existential writers, whether they be of the American 
varieties such as Wright and Ellison—to which I would add Baldwin and Morrison of 
Bluest Eye—and Fanon and Lamming bring to the fore that the contradictions we live are of 
a systemic nature, true, but that does not mean that there cannot be a humanistic resolve to 
assert the value of humanity, as did our ancestors against worst odds. 
 The water-laden world of Castle eventually overflows in revolt, but as in Sartre’s 
admonitions, prescience in the African Diaspora met in the coincidence of Frazier, Fanon, 





ensuing neocolonial, in a word, slime.  Behold: 
“What do you think about Mr. Slime?”  I asked.  I wanted to hear 
him further on the land.  Perhaps I wanted to form an opinion myself [of the 
consequences of Mr. Slime’s intervention at the moment of the villager’s 
fury against the landlord’s and overseers’ actions against them]. 
“I don’t have to think much ’bout him,” said Trumper.  “An’ I not at 
all surprised that he do what he do.  ’Tis what I learn in the States, an’ I 
know how to handle all the Slimes that come my way.  Way back he promise 
that he’d make these people here owners o’ this land.  He tell them there 
wasn’t nothing to prevent them buying this lan’, and he wus right, ‘cause I 
know for a fact that the very money that go in that Penny Bank an’ Society 
buy this land in his name.  That’s what I know.  Nothin’ he do ain’t surprise 
me.” 
“There are others involved,” I said.  “I know some of them.” 
“’Course there is,” said Trumper.  “There’s always more’n one in 
this kind o’ deal.  They ain’t surprise me.  The man who set me thinkin’ is 
the landlord.  I don’t quite understan’ why he take that risk.  He take a good 
risk” (p. 323).8 
 
We needn’t here recount the history of what became the national bourgeoisie in African and 
Caribbean neocolonial politics.   Although Sartre’s aim is a phenomenological description 
of an ontological category and Lamming’s is explicitly political, we see here a meeting of 
ontological, psychological, and political description in Sartre’s 1943 description: 
But the slimy offers a horrible image; it is horrible in itself for a 
consciousness to become slimy.  This is because the being of the slimy is a 
soft clinging, there is a sly solidarity and complicity of all its leech-like 
parts, a vague, soft effort made by each to individualize itself, followed by a 
falling back and flattening out that is emptied of the individual, sucked in on 
all sides by the substance.  A consciousness which became slimy would be 
transformed by the thick stickiness of its ideas.  From the time of our 
upsurge into the world, we are haunted by the image of a consciousness 
which would like to launch forth into the future, toward a projection of self, 
and which at the very moment when it was conscious of arriving there would 
be slyly held back by the invisible suction of the past and which would have 
to assist in its own slow dissolution in this past which it was fleeing, would 
have to aid in the invasion of its project by a thousand parasites until finally 
it completely lost itself (Being and Nothingness, p. 778). 
 
Looking onward from such grounds 





in favor of those premised on the human condition.  The human condition, anchored in 
reality, takes the mechanisms of nature seriously, as Lamming observes in his reflection on 
culture in his interview with David Scott.  But as the very existential early Marx, 
approvingly cited by Lamming, observes, “If we assume man to be man, and his relation to 
the world to be a human one, then love can be exchanged only for love, trust for trust, and 
so on.”9  Marx is, of course, speaking of what it means to live in a human world; a world 
that is a function, fragile though it may be, of things only human.  It is in stream with 
reflections found in Hannah Arendt’s Human Condition, where the divisions of labor, work, 
and action affect the tenor of societies in which any one dominates.  Labor is a function of 
biological necessity; no labor, no life.  Work, however, is the activity of making worlds.  It 
is the realm of the imagination, the realm of the artist or what it means to be in a creative 
relation to one’s life’s tasks.  And action is the condition for risk, glory, and power, where 
words meet deeds to manifest her meaning of the political.  Crucial in this schema is the 
importance of thought and the ongoing process of thinking and their necessary relationship 
with the political.   
 It is a mistake to read an existential analysis as an over-individualized ideology of 
the libertarian vein.  The bad faith manifested by such a position rests on its denial of the 
necessary conditions for its assertion.  Individuals make no sense without a community 
from which and in which to be differentiated.  So, too, is community.  Collectivisms that 
reject any notion of an individual upsurge collapses into mere aggregates of distinct units 
that do not meet.  To “meet” requires sociality, which requires an intersubjective, ever-
changing whole.  But this dynamic reality is a function of communication and language.  
Denying the reality of such phenomena and their necessary relationship to the kinds of 
beings we are lead to performative contradictions.  The performative contradiction in 
denying social reality is that “denial” is communicative, is outward directed, even where 
the reference is to the self, which makes it social.  It is, in other words, a social rejection of 
the social.  Another form of denial are the conditions through which denial can be advanced 
in the first place.  One of these is the notion of a human nature.  The advancement of a 





made.  The problem is that it places our relation to structures as the cart before the horse.  
Structures set the conditions for us, but they do not determine what we will do and the 
meaning of our various projects in life.  This is so by virtue of many of us doing different 
things and creating new forms of meaning in structurally similar, if not same, 
circumstances.  The human world is, in other words, lived, and it is creatively so.  Appeals 
to individual natures won’t help in such cases since the observer would need prior cases to 
establish this instance as part of a series that constitutes a nature.  It is a contradiction of 
terms.  An individual nature by definition pertains only to this individual, which means its 
status as a law of action or identity cannot be advanced beyond itself, and even to itself it 
becomes limited since it would have to create such a separation of self from self. 
 The social world is the foundation of the political one, but both worlds are 
achievements at each moment of the historical unfolding of the human species. The attack 
on thinking rests in an effort to wipe out the political.   We live in an epoch fearful of 
thinking beings.  Its material form is the current disaster of market fundamentalism, where 
no critical reflection on the market is tolerated.   In political economic terms, we are living 
in the triumph of a labor-centered proliferation of leisure time without cultivating 
conditions for work and action.  Thus, labor-socializing without labor production leads to 
consumption as our primary relationship with the “outside” world.  The result of such 
activities is a decline those that depend on thought over those that depend, simply, on want.  
As thinking declines, so does distinction, and where there is no distinction, we collapse 
under the force of sameness or mandatory sameness (where thinking is indecent).  All this 
amounts to a new form of what in days past would simply be called totalitarianism.   Ours 
is a world of market totalitarianism, a world in which there is literally no room for any 
other alternative formulation of the human spirit.  And where thought cannot experience 
rupture or difference, then it projects itself as no longer conditioned but determined.  In 
effect, a very inhuman conception of the human has begun to take form beyond the 
mechanisms of exploitation to that of solidification, to that of wiping away the human as 
possibility into the human as fact.  This collapse, the rendering of the human as law-





Fanon warned nearly half a century ago.   We need new material conditions in which to 
live.  But we need new concepts by which to live. 
 The black existential turn brings with it, then, a carillon call for constantly renewed 
and revalued practices of freedom.  In that task, we have indeed been fortunate to have 
George Lamming as one of our best allies in our continued struggle to build such a path to a 
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